



International Civil Aviation Organization

**The Second Meeting of the Ad Hoc Afghanistan Contingency Group Meeting
(AHACG/2)**

Istanbul, Turkey, 17-19 November 2014

**Agenda Item 4: Civil/Military cooperation, contingency promulgation and implementation
(safety cases, security analysis, etc.)**

SAFETY/ SECURITY ANALYSIS AND CIVIL/MILITARY COOPERATION

(Presented by the Secretariat)

SUMMARY

This paper presents information on planning and coordination that should be undertaken to enable robust contingency planning at both the State and regional level to occur, taking into account the need for improved civil/military cooperation in order to create an optimal, efficient scheme using all the State's resources.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 At the AHACG/1 meeting (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 11-12 September 2014), ICAO noted that plans using current ATS routes did not need the approval of the ICAO Council, but there were already some contingency routes being used in Iran. He noted that all States and Organisations should support Afghanistan in its efforts regarding procuring and transitioning ANS as described. Moreover, ICAO stated that contingency plans should be sent to ICAO by 10 October and include an assessment of:

- a) capacity, using modelling/simulation;
- b) safety, identifying required mitigation actions;
- c) security, if applicable, due to conflict zones en-route; and
- d) timeline for implementation including approvals, Letters of Agreement and publication of aeronautical information and coordinating and publishing revised airline schedules.

1.2 IFATCA had emphasised to the meeting that conflict situations had to be a serious flight risk to be considered by airlines when planning routes in certain areas of the world after the tragic loss of MH17. When considering their route options, operators would obviously maintain safety as their first priority; however any rerouting by airlines could have an adverse effect on the adjacent airspace with regard to traffic intensity and route complexity, and thus cause another safety issue.

1.3 The meeting had also noted that no contingency arrangement could be successful unless it had been consulted with all affected stakeholders, including *inter alia*, airlines, military, ATC units, and aerodrome operators. Each involved State must ensure that there was an adequate effort to identify potential problems that could be addressed in designing the contingency scheme, or mitigated as part of a safety analysis. In addition, such consultation improved buy-in and conformance.

2. DISCUSSION

Contingency and Safety Plans

2.1 As at 07 November 2014, more than three weeks after the expected date of submission determined by the AHACG/1 meeting, only Iran had provided early details of its contingency planning, which was contained within AHACG/2/WP05 (Agenda Item 3). Further discussion of this plan was necessary to take into account issues such as the Gulf contingency routing scheme already in place within the Tehran FIR, additional waypoints on the Tehran/Karachi FIR boundary, Karachi's longitudinal separation requirements, and Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan's requirements.

2.2 After an overall draft contingency scheme was agreed by the AHACG, it would be necessary for States to then complete their safety and security cases to ensure what was being proposed was safe. Given the time that these cases would take, it was likely that these would be developed in the months immediately after AHACG/2, and presented to a third meeting of the AHACG in 2015 for final analysis. Notwithstanding this, States were expected to present any early information on safety/security issues at the AHACG/2 meeting so other stakeholders were cognizant of them, even before the finalization of formal safety and security cases, taking into account such matters as, *inter alia*:

- a) Safety Case –
 - i. simulator and safety team assessment of the contingency scheme to determine:
 - potential safety issues and mitigating actions;
 - appropriateness of capacity and flow management procedures¹;
 - training needs and programme;
 - minimum CNS infrastructure availability and redundancy; and
 - transition arrangements between contingency and non-contingency airspace;
 - ii. details of how coordination and communication mechanisms between ATS units, including how Letters of Agreement will be effective;
 - iii. human performance assessments for ATM and airlines to minimize human factors issues;
 - iv. promulgation standards for the effective update of ATM and airline aeronautical databases (note should be made of the information in AHACG/1/WP07); and
 - v. consideration of irregular events, both natural and unnatural (e.g.: convective weather, depressurisation, provision of essential traffic information, significant meteorological information and search and rescue); and
- b) Security Case to ensure the safe passage of flights –
 - i. assessment of civil/military procedures;
 - ii. assessment of conflict zones; and
 - iii. security of key ANS facilities.

¹ Capacity measures will include longitudinal/lateral spacings and FLAS, operational positions, etc.

High Level Meeting on Afghanistan Contingency Planning

2.3 The Director-General of the Hong Kong Civil Aviation Division had written to ICAO to confirm support for the High Level Meeting of Afghanistan Contingency Planning, 28 November 2014 in Hong Kong, China. This meeting was intended to provide a forum for senior decision-makers to be briefed on the progress of Afghanistan contingency planning, and to take action where appropriate to support such planning such as brief military authorities on the need for flexibility in these circumstances. Unfortunately, the lack of safety and security cases before the AHACG/2 meeting precluded a briefing on the safety and security aspects that would need to be considered prior to any go-ahead for the overall scheme. However, the High Level Meeting was expected to:

- a) establish agreed policies to facilitate the expedition of a safe, efficient and fair contingency scheme;
- b) consider the necessary financial and personnel resources required to support an agreed contingency scheme (either by AHACG or by the High Level Meeting itself), including any sharing of facilities, systems and capabilities;
- c) discuss the means of maximising civil/military cooperation in the affected area;
- d) support amended inter-State contingency arrangements where necessary, including updated ATS Letters of Agreement;
- e) discuss, if appropriate, the effect of sanctions on certain key ATM infrastructure in the affected region; and
- f) commit to the conduct of appropriate safety and security assessments, and the monitoring of any contingency scheme.

3. ACTION BY THE MEETING

3.1 The meeting is invited to:

- a) note the information contained in this paper;
- b) urge States to develop their safety and security cases in accordance with the contents in paragraph 2.2;
- c) discuss the enhancement of civil/military cooperation mechanisms needed to support any contingency scheme; and
- d) discuss any relevant matters as appropriate.

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